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I
INTRODUCTION
Everyone seems to be mad at the American legal system. Among lawyers,
judges, legal scholars, and self-proclaimed public interest advocates of various
ideological persuasions, it is hard to find anyone who will dispute the
proposition that America's system of civil justice is in need of major reform.
The debate over the sources of this dissatisfaction tends to follow certain
well-worn paths.' Delay and expense often head the list of suspects.2 Those
concerned about delay often argue that Americans file too many lawsuits, '
dragging the courts into areas where they have no business.4 Others focus on
the related problem of cost. Lawyers' fees are too high to start with, it is
argued, and the problem is compounded by inevitable delays. 5 Many critics
also identify a decline in the competence and ethical standards of lawyers as a
source of dissatisfaction with the law."
Anyone who has had experience with the legal system will recognize
substantial elements of truth in all of these assertions. People do file frivolous
suits, courts sometimes do go beyond their competence, litigation is too
expensive for most people, and some lawyers do perform poorly. There can
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REv. 72, 74 n. I (1983); Rosenberg, Civil Jistice Research and CiviliJustice Reform, 15 LAN' & Soc'y REv.
473, 481-83 (1980-81).
6. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 11; Burger, The Role of the Law School in the Teaching of Legal Ethics
and Professionial Responsibility. 29 CLE''. ST. L. RE''. 377, 379-83 (1980).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
be little question that all of these factors contribute to public dissatisfaction
with and disrespect for the legal system, and all deserve attention when
considering legal reform.
After three years of studying lay people in the informal courts 7 of
Colorado, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania, however, we believe that debate
on this level may mask even deeper problems. Implicit in conventional
critiques is the assumption that most litigants come to the legal system to
pursue discrete, usually economic objectives. Dissatisfaction results when
expense, delay, professional malfeasance, or some comparable factor
complicates the pursuit. In other words, it is assumed that litigants
understand the purpose of the law and are frustrated by flaws in its delivery.8
Historically, reform movements have focused on problems of delivery and
have been evaluated in terms of their ability to solve those problems."'
This article presents extracts from a large corpus of ethnographic data that
cast doubt on these assumptions. Using anthropological and linguistic
research methods, we have investigated litigants' "hidden agendas"' t -the
unappreciated factors that cause people to resort to the legal system and the
undisclosed objectives that they pursue within the system. Every trial lawyer
has dealt with clients driven by hidden agendas: the plaintiff who rejects an
economically reasonable settlement out of pride or anger, or the corporate
official who capitulates too quickly out of fear of disclosure of an office
romance. ' I To our knowledge, however, there has been no scholarly effort to
study the significance of litigants' hidden agendas, perhaps because of their
inaccessibility to conventional research techniques.' 2 This article attempts to
demonstrate that although hidden agendas may indeed be inaccessible to
7. As we use the term, informal courts are small claims and similar courts which use relaxed
rules of procedure and evidence in adjudicating cases with limited amounts in controversy. The
most significant feature of all of these courts is that they encourage lay people to litigate their cases
without lawyers. For a more complete description of the particular courts we studied, see Conley &
O'Barr, Foodainenils of Jnrisprudence. .An Ethoograph ofJudicial Decision Making in lhformal Courts, 66
N.C.L. REv. 467, 476-77 (1988).
8. See Trubek .-4ccess ll)/hotis/ce? On Reading ond Using the Newer Law and Society Litepo/ore, Lw
& CoNi .sIP. PROBS., Autumn 1988, at I 11.
9. A review of the history of legal reform is well beyond the scope of this article. For
illustrations of the point made in the text, see Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: .A Proposal for
Resricted Field Expeiiments, L.AW & CONi EMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67 (discussing the evaluation of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Metzloff, Empirical Perspectives on Medical Valpraclice Litigatioo,
LAW & CON rENP. PROiS., Autumn 1988, at 199 (study of medical malpractice litigation).
10. To our knowledge, the term first appeared in the sociolegal literature in Vidmar, The Small
Claims Cour." ..1 AReconcepluali:ation of DTspu/es and an Empirical Investigation, 18 LAW & Soc's REV. 515,
515 (1984).
11. Hidden agendas are visible even from the pinnacle of the American legal system. See Burger,
supa note 2, at 275 ("Americans are increasingly turning to the courts for relief from a range of
personal distresses and anxieties.").
12. There is, of course, abundant experimental evidence from the procedural justice tradition
that litigants concern themselves with issues other than the outcome of their cases. See infr note 20.
The comment in the text is directed to the lack of study of hidden agendas as they operate in actual
litigation. Vidmar, supra note 10, has recognized the importance of hidden agendas in his research
on small claims courts. In their ongoing study of mediation, McEwen and Maiman have also
recognized some of the specific extralegal factors that contribute materially to litigant satisfaction.
See McEwen & Maiman, Coercion and Consent: .4I Tale of Two Court Reforms, 10 LAw & Poi.'v 3 (1988).
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those relying on records collected and kept by the courts or on social science
data collected with a view toward quantification, they are discoverable if one
pays close attention to what litigants say in and out of court.
Extensive linguistic evidence supports the existence and importance of
hidden agendas. These agendas have both substantive and procedural
components: Many litigants come to court in pursuit of objectives beyond the
limited competence of the law, while others seek rewards from their
participation in the process that bear little relation to the favorable judgment
that is the presumed goal of every litigant. We conclude that the discontinuity
between litigant agendas and the operating assumptions of the system may be
a fundamental source of public dissatisfaction with the law. Accordingly, we
argue, the effort to understand litigants' hidden agendas is an essential
component of any thoughtful attempt to evaluate existing procedures or
design new ones.
II
THE METHOD: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF DISCOURSE
The research reported here is part of a three-year study of lay people in
the legal process.' 5 The focus of the project has been on the general issues of
lay people's understandings of the law and reactions to the legal process.
Specific questions such as how lay people decide when they have a legal
problem, how they develop legal theories, and how they decide the things that
constitute adequate proof and appropriate evidence have been studied. 14 The
research has also yielded abundant data on the topic discussed here-litigant
goals and motivations.
We have studied informal court litigants in three states: Colorado, North
Carolina, and Pennsylvania.' 5 We collected data at three stages in the
litigation process. Plaintiffs were interviewed as they came to court to file
their cases' and were observed and tape recorded during their trials. In
addition, plaintiffs and defendants were interviewed after trial.' 7 An open-
ended interview technique was used to encourage litigants to talk about their
cases and their views of the law and the legal process. The litigants were
permitted to guide the interviews, and the researchers introduced topics of
13. The findings of this research project to date have been reported in several articles. These
include: Conley & O'Barr, supra note 7; O'Barr & Conley, Lilgan Salisfaftion lestns Legal .4deqaj in
Small Claims Court .Varratives, 19 LAW & Soc'N RF.v. 661 (1985): Conley & O'Barr, Riules V ersus
Relationships in Small Claims Disputes, in CONFLICT TiALK (A. Grimshaw ed., f'orthcoming 1989); O'Barr
& Conley, Lay Expertations ofthe Civiljiistice S stem, 22 LAw & Soc'v REv. 137 (1988).
14. Supra note 13.
15. For a more complete discussion of our reasons for selecting these jurisdictions, see Conley
& O'Barr, sapra note 7, at 476-77.
16. Our intention was to find and interview defendants belore trial as well, but most proved
diflicult to locate and unwilling to be interviewed. A few suspected that we were agents of the
plaintiffor the court, and many others were simply so angry that they had been sued that they did not
want to talk about it.
17. The data collection was carried Out under confidentialitv agreements approved by the
various courts.
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concern to the research program only when the litigants themselves failed to
do so. In the course of the investigation, more than 100 cases were studied in
this manner.
Our analytic method, called the ethnography of discourse, relies on the
detailed scrutiny of litigant speech. Its basic premise is that the careful,
qualitative study of unrehearsed speech can provide important clues to the
goals, strategies, and thought processes of the speaker., At the conclusion of
the data collection phase of the project, we prepared transcripts of each
interview and trial. We studied the cases in analytic sessions in which we and
three or four other researchers trained in law, social science, or both focused
our native-speaker intuition and varied professional perspectives on the data.
In a typical two-hour session, we analyzed a single case or interview of average
length (five to ten pages of text), or a segment of a longer one. With the
transcript in front of us, we listened to the recording several times and then
spent about twenty minutes writing notes about those features that were of
interest to us. We then engaged in a round-table discussion of our
observations.
The issues in this article were not identified in advance, but emerged as
significant questions because they attracted the attention of the analysts
repeatedly. Because the speech of the litigants was the only data, these issues
were drawn to the reseachers' attention by the litigants themselves. Although
the method used, which has substantial precedent in social science research,"'1
does not yield simple, categorical, or readily quantifiable results, its use avoids
the a priori judgments that are inherent in survey or directed interview
techniques and is thus particularly well suited for identifying the hidden
concerns and strategies of litigants.
The remainder of this article presents two cases that illustrate,
respectively, the nature of procedural and substantive hidden agendas. Only
two cases are presented because the method requires the presentation and
fine-grained analysis of lengthy texts. However, these cases and the
conclusions drawn from them are representative of many other cases
investigated.
III
PROCEDURAL GOALS: LAW AS THERAPY
The first case illustrates the simple but significant fact that some litigants
come to the legal process with a hidden agenda that has important procedural
components. The recognition that litigants are concerned with procedure is
not new. Indeed, experimental research in the procedural justice tradition
has shown convincingly that litigants sometimes value procedural fairness
18. "11LJanguage patterns are unconscious and provide access to unconscious cultural patterning
otherwise inaccessible to researchers." Sherzer, .1 Discouse(-Cenitered .4pproaci to Languag'e and Culture,
89 Am. ANTI iiROi'O.O(;iS 295, 295 (1987) (discussing the work of three of the founders of modern
linguistics, Boas, Sapir, and Whorf).
19. See, e.g., |. ATKINSON & 1P. I)RFW, ORDER IN COURT 1-33 (1979).
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over a successful outcome in evaluating legal processes. 2 11 Missing from the
literature is a means of specifically identifying litigants' concerns about
procedure as they develop in actual litigation. The ethnography of discourse
is particularly well suited to this task because the litigants identify the specific
issues of concern to them. The evolution and treatment of these issues can be
followed as the litigants think and speak about them.
The plaintiff in the first case, Sarah Freeman,2' is a young graphic artist.
She contracted with the defendant, a manufacturer's representative doing
business as a corporation, to design a logo, stationery, and business cards.
When she tried to deliver the work and collect her fee, the defendant refused
to talk to her. She sued the corporation to collect the fee.
Freeman arrived in court on the trial date with the contract, her record of
correspondence with the defendant, and her portfolio. The defendant failed
to appear. The judge raised an initial question about whether Freeman
intended to sue the corporation (the defendant she had served with process)
or its proprietor. Freeman asked the judge's opinion and he told her that he
was not allowed to give legal advice, and that she should consult a lawyer. She
was excused from the courtroom to do so. When she returned, acting on the
advice of her lawyer, she asked for a default judgment against the corporate
defendant. The judge questioned her briefly in order to establish the
elements of the contract claim and the basis for her damages and then entered
judgment for the amount she claimed. The entire proceeding took about two
minutes.
We later interviewed the judge who had heard the Freeman case. We
asked him about default cases in general, and in particular about this case,
which he remembered. In Text IA the judge explains his policy for handling
defaults and makes specific reference to Sarah Freeman.
TEXT I A
JUDGE: Yeah, O.K. But what they don't recognize is this-they've gotta
be prepared, as if the person is going to be there and defend
against the case. But what they don't recognize is the fact that if
the person isn't there, that all I've got to do is do what we call a
prina facie case. We don't have to get involved with all these
details. She got her judgment.
INTERVIEWER: Oh, she got everything she wanted?
JUDGE: That's what I said-she got everything she wanted. And w%,hat
they don't recognize is why should we take the time to go
into all these letails just to give her her day in court when
20. Research in the procedural justice tradition began with the publication ofJ. lt-IBAUT & L.
WALKER, PROCEDURAt. JUSTICE: A PsVictOLOGIC.At ANALYSIS (1975). In the last few years, procedural
justice researchers have begun to isolate some of the psychological factors that influence disputants'
procedural preferences. See, e.g., Breit & Goldberg, Grievnnce .lediatio, in he Coal hidust y: .4 Field
Expemimenl, 37 INDus. & LAB. REtL. REV. 49 (1983) (disputants value control of process because they
view it as a means of controlling outcome); Tyler, Rasinski & McGraw, The hlfluemae of Perceived Injustice
on the Endorsemett of Political Leaders, 15J. Art'. Soc. PsticLo(.ov 700 (1985) (process control valued
as guarantee of opportunity flor self-expression). Foi a recent and comprehensive review of the field,
see E. L.IND & IT. IYLER, tli1E SOCtA. I'SvCtiO.OGY OF PROC(EDcRAs. JUSiCE (1988).
21. In order to protect the privacy of the parties whose cases we report in this article, original
names and other idemi'ing features have been changed.
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she got what she wanted. All she came in for was the
judgment.
From the perspective of judicial administration, it is difficult to imagine a
more thoroughly reasonable policy. Out of concern for the rights of the
absent defendant, the judge insists on the presentation of a prima facie case.
However, in order to save the time of the plaintiff and those waiting in the
courtroom for their cases to be heard, the judge hears nothing more than a
skeletal prima facie case before awarding the judgment.22 He thus balances
the interests of justice and convenience in a seemingly appropriate way.
We interviewed Freeman shortly after her case was heard and found her to
be one of the most dissatisfied litigants we have encountered in three years of
research. In Text IB, she responds to our request to discuss the procedure
the judge followed.
FREEMAN:
INTERVIEWER:
FREEMAN:
INTERVIEWER:
FREEMAN:
INTERVIEWER:
FREEMAN:
TEXT l B
I feel like I am furious I didn't get to tell that [my story]. I
spent, you know, a good part of my night last night preparing
that, to have the judge not give a damn, basically is how I felt. I
felt he was very short. I felt that he was not, tim, let me put it, a
little less than professional in the wav that he was dealing with
that court today. Personally, um. ..
Could you say what you mean by "a little less than
professional"? What reason ...
Yeah, he was giving me information. He was jumbling things
for me so that I didn't understand it. And he was expecting me
to understand what was going on there like I am a lawyer. I am
not a lawyer. He failed to listen to what I had to say.
By listening to what you had to say, do you mean the context
and the, uh...
My presentation. And there's a reason why I spent that kind of
time putting it together.
Like what would you have said in your presentation? What was
it all about?
My presentation just delineated how things developed, that he
owed me the money, um, the meetings that took place, the
understandings of how much money he owed me, um, some
other information about the company as well as the payments
he made for payments. Some other things-and I explained it
in the presentation.
The most striking aspect of Text IB is the clash of perspectives between
judge and litigant. The attitude that the judge sees as efficient, Freeman sees
as "short." What the judge seems to view as a fair balancing of interests,
Freeman views as "less than professional." Most significantly, whereas the
judge believed that "all she came in for was the judgment," Freeman never
even mentioned the judgment as mitigating the procedural affront she had
received.
The conflict between Freeman and the judge suggests several things about
the evaluation of procedure. On a general level, it confirms that procedure is
sometimes more important to lay litigants than outcome, a point that
22. Later in the interview, the judge noted that he calls the complete list of cases at the start of
each court session and disposes of all the delaults before starling the contested cases.
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procedural justice research has clearly established in laboratory contexts. 21
The case also illustrates that even sophisticated litigants often misunderstand
the most basic legal concepts. 24 Thus, Freeman felt that the judge was
treating her like a lawyer when he asked her to declare her intention to sue an
individual or a corporate defendant.
More specifically, the case demonstrates that litigants' hidden agendas
sometimes have significant procedural components. In identifying their
objectives in coming to court, litigants may focus not only on ends they hope
to achieve, but on procedural opportunities that are of importance to them.
Freeman echoed a procedural concern we have heard from many litigants:
the need to tell one's story. In a variety of contexts, litigants have recounted
that the opportunity to tell their whole story is sometimes more important
than the result.2 5 Some losers have reported that the chance to tell their story
to the judge made the whole effort worthwhile, whereas some winners, such as
Freeman, have gone away dissatisfied because their story went untold.
The telling of the story seems to be important for two reasons. First, many
people see the litigation process as a form of therapy. As in other kinds of
therapy, the central, cathartic element is the chance to relate one's troubles to
an authoritative yet sympathetic listener.2"1 A second, related issue that
emerges from our data is the desire expressed by many litigants for "official"
validation of the seriousness of their problems. As Freeman put it, it was
devastating-irrespective of the outcome--"to have the judge not give a
damn." A number of other, unsuccessful litigants have commented on how
important it was for the judge to show appreciation for the gravity of their
situation, even if no legal help was forthcoming. For such litigants, the
dominant emotion seems to be relief at learning that someone in a position of
authority understands why they are upset.
Lawyers and judges with whom we have discussed the issue of procedural
hidden agendas have sometimes rejected our findings out of hand, observing
that the legal system has neither the resources nor the expertise to address
litigants' psychological needs. However, the demands that litigants such as
Freeman make on the system are often minimal. For example, she
acknowledged in the interview that she understood that there was no legal
reason for the judge to hear her story. She would have been satisfied if the
judge had only "said to me the case is decided, period, no matter what you
have to say from here on out. I'm sorry that you wasted your time, you wasted
your time on your presentation." All she sought was "some sort of
understanding." In her words, -[t]hat would have taken care of it." By
paying attention to what litigants say rather than acting on assumptions about
23. See supra note 20.
24. See O'Barr & Conle, La E.xpectalion s of the Civil Jusice ,vstem, 22 LA\w & Soc'V REV. 137
(1988).
25. Cf Yngvesson & Hennessevy Small Claim., Complex Disputes: .-i Review of the Small Claims
Lucita/mre, 9 LAW & Soc'N REV. 219, 260 (1975) (opporttnitv for self-expression contributes to
litigants, willingness to Coil) promise).
26. See nfi-a note 43 and accoInisying text.
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their objectives and concerns, the law may discover opportunities to bring
about material increases in litigant satisfaction in exchange for a minimal
commitment of time and resources. We return to this theme in the conclusion
of the article.
IV
SUBSTANTIVE GOALS: THE ASSESSMENT OF WHAT LITIGANTS WANT
One question that is common to almost every evaluative study of
procedure is the frequency with which a given category of litigants (plaintiffs,
defendants, tenants, consumers, or others) prevails. 27 Counting winners and
losers appears to be a straightforward task until one considers that it is first
necessary to determine what the parties wanted when they came to court. For
example, it is impossible to characterize a $500 judgment for a plaintiff as
either a success or failure without knowing the plaintiffs goals and
expectations in bringing the suit. One potential source of such information is
the plaintiffs complaint. However, as Vidmar argues, comparing a plaintiffs
demands to what he actually receives may not be meaningful, because "the
plaintiff's demand for compensation does not necessarily capture the
difference between the parties."2  Other information pertinent to measuring
success may include the plaintiffs opinion about the worth of the case; the
amount actually in dispute, taking into account any concessions the defendant
may be willing to make; and any hidden agenda the plaintiff may be pursuing.
Analysis of the case of Motley v. Newell illustrates the elusiveness of litigant
objectives. The plaintiff, William Mottley, claims to have "co-signed" 2' an
installment sales contract to enable the defendant, Shirley Newell, to buy
some furniture. Newell has failed to make the payments, and Mottley has paid
two monthly installments at the demand of the furniture store. Mottley now
seeks to enforce Newell's alleged promise to be responsible for the payments.
In Text 2A, the plaintiff gives the first indication of his desired result.
Interestingly, this colloquy takes place before the judge has sworn the
witnesses and is thus not evidence. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that
Mottley's objective is clearly communicated, even if not, as seen here, clearly
understood.
TIEXT 2A °
JUDGE: Is William M-O-T-[-L-E-Y here?
MO-FLEY: Yes.
Judge calls Vewell.]
27. See, e.g., McEwen & Maiman, sunpra note 12, at 6.
28. Vidmar, supra note 10, at 516.
29. It is unclear whether he is in fact a co-signer. He did not put the contract into evidence, and
the judge did not ask him about its contents. The defendant testified that the plaintiff was the only
signer.
30. It should be noted that Mottley is not a native speaker of American English, a fact that will
help to explain some of the more tnusual features of his testimony. We do not believe, however,
that there are any essential differences between this litigant and the large number of others whose
cases we have studied.
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JUDGE: Before you start, sir, urn, what are you seeking here this
morning?
MOTTLEY: Urn, possession of my furn-, of the furniture.
JUDGE: Possession of furniture?
MOT'TLEY: Yeah.
After the swearing of the parties, the judge invites Mottley to tell his story.
In Text 2B, Mottley gives a lengthy account of his arrangement with Newell
and his efforts to collect the payments from her.
TEXT 2B
JUDGE: Mottley versus Shirley Newell. If you will, sir, you may begin.
Court's in session at this time.
MOFI'LEY: Urn, Shirley New-, Newell, I don't know her before. Her
girlfriend is my friend. I went to school with her. She [Newell's
friend] introduced me to her [Newell] as her friend. So she
[Newell] asked me, one, if I could co-sign for her to get some
furniture from Rhodes Company, which I agree. I told her, I
said, "I don't want to do it then, I don't want to do it then.
Later on it will be trouble, but if you trust yourself that you
would make the payment, I will help you." [iHe descibes meeting
.\ewvell at Rhodes Furniture.] I signed the lease for her to get a
dinette set and I left. When I left, she and Nicole [Newell's
friend] went behind me to room furniture and added more
items to, to the furniture. We, I think that that amounted to
$820. So when I got the first bill, because it is co-signed in my
name, so they, they mailed the bill to me. So when it got, when
it, when I got the first bill, I was mad.
So I got mad. I went to her, I said, "Look, what you did is not
good, that fraudery. I could take you to court. But anyway,
since we are all friend, if you make your payment, it's O.K. with
me. Just make sure you make your payment." She said, 'I'll
make my payment. I always make my payment." I said, "You
saving that now, but when time come, it will be trouble."
So the first payment [bill] came, the first payment came to me. I
took the stuff [bill] to her house. She didn't even want to open
the door. I had to, she opened the door. I gave it to her. I
said, "I only brought this payment stub which is $44 a month.
It, it'll give you seventeen days to pay." I gave it to her at the
beginning part of the month. So she said, "I'll pay my bill,"
and I left. After the seventeenth, about two weeks later, I call
her one night. I said, "Have you made a payment?" She said,
"'Yes, I made my paymient."
So when I looked this, on the month end of the second, the, uh,
second bill came. I saw on it $88." I said, "But how come? She
told me she made her payment." Then I went to her house.
When I went to her house, she said, "I have made a payment."
I said, "To who?" She lie to me. She called somebody who
does not even work at Rhodes Furniture - she said she made
payment to a girl. [Alottley goes on to describe a lengthy discussion
among .Vezell, .Nicole, and hitiself cs a iesult of ihich .\ewell paid him
S88.1
JUDGE: She gave you how much monev?
MOTI'LEY: She gave me $88 for the first $88 1 have already paid.
Several aspects of Text 2B are notable. First, it is striking that Mottley
begins his testimony by responding to an accusation-that he knew Newell
"before"-that no one has made in court. The implication is that Mottley
views his courtroom testimony not as a discrete episode with a clear beginning
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and end, but as part of an ongoing conversation. He and Newell are the
principals in this conversation, with Nicole, the judge, and others drifting in
and out as bit players. The fact that Mottley picks up this conversation in mid-
stream, by responding to an accusation made at another time and place, also
suggests that he has more in mind than the legal remedies of collection and
repossession. In particular, his fixation on his continuing dialogue with
Newell suggests that the specific legal problem he brings to court is symbolic
of the larger problems in their relationship.
Relatedly, note the extraordinarily personal and dramatic quality of his
account of the transaction. He continually uses direct quotation, reporting
not only his conversations with Newell but even his soliloquizing on passing
events ["I said, 'But how come?' "]. He sometimes steps out of his
performing role to make evaluative comments about the characters in the
drama ["I was mad"; "she lie to me"]. The effect of all this is to underline his
emotional stake in what purports to be a business transaction with a person
whom he did not know "before."
The judge's single interruption in this lengthy narrative indicates that his
focus is on the narrow issues of specific legal relevance rather than on the
unfolding personal drama. The interruption is particularly interesting
because it seems gratuitious: Can the judge possibly have missed the twice-
stated point, "She gave me $88"? One is tempted to interpret the judge's
interruption not as a question, but as an emphatic statement about the limits
of the court's interest and power.
After Text 2B, Mottley continues his narrative in the same fashion, replete
with performance and personal commentary. He repeats his description of
collecting the initial $88 payment, and then recounts his receipt of the bill for
the third month. Once again, the judge interrupts, ostensibly to clarify issues
of legal relevance.
MOTTLEY:
JUDGE:
MOTTLEY:
JUDGE:
MOTFLEY:
JUDGE:
MO-ITLEY:
JUDGE:
MOTTLEY:
JUDGE:
MOTTLEY:
JUDGE:
MOTTLEY:
JUDGE:
MOI-ILEY:
JUDGE:
MOIFI.EY:
TEXT 2C
Last month, the stuff came. When I -, the stuff came. When I
took the stuff to her house, she won't open the door.
Let me ask y'ou a question, sir. Where is the furniture at this
time?
She, she, she had it to her house.
Now, inasmuch as you are saying that, urn, Ms. Newell has this
furniture that you co-signed lor
Yeah.
Now, how about the deal with, uh, Rhodes Furniture Company?
Who is taking care of that?
I am taking care of it now.
So, you are paying this bill?
On my own now.
On your own, to Rhodes Furniture Company?
Yeah, yeah-because it's in my name.
Yeah, I understand.
And I don't want my credit to spoil.
I understand, you co-signed for Ms. Newell.
[hat's right.
Thank you very much.
I'm not through.
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After thus seizing the floor at the end of the judge's interrogation, Mottley
recycles his narrative, returning to his description of Newell's refusal to open
the door. He tells of filing the suit for the third and fourth months' payments,
and his difficulties in obtaining service. Then, in Text 2D, he concludes his
presentation by reiterating his opening demand for repossession.
TEXT 2D
MOrITLEY: I went back and make another payment again before I file to her
working place. There where they-I think that where they got
her-that why she been, she been hiding. And then two month
and she had not pay, so I, I had paid it two months. I want to
repossess the furniture. I will take over the, if I don't need it, I
need it, but 1, I will take, I will take care of it.
The judge turns to Newell for her version in Text 2E. She responds
directly to several of Mottley's accusations, and offers explanations for her
behavior, but does not address the basic question of the debt.
TEXT 2E
JUDGE: Um, Ms. Newell, you have heard the testimony coming from the
gentleman here. If you have something, the court will honor it
at this time.
NEWELL: Yes, I do. First of all, Mr. Mottley knew exactly what I was
getting, becatuse Jack Roy, the salesman at the store, told him,
showed him the paper in which what was written on there, that I
was getting. They said there was no way that anyone could go
and add anything on his account, because it's in his name-he
did not co-sign. It's in his name, period. Mr. Mottley came to
my house before the seventeenth. The bill is past due on the
seventeenth of the month. I told him at that time I had gave mv
money to my friend to go pay for me because I had no
transportation . . . [she explais wh she has no receipt for the
payment].
As far as him saying that I was dodging the sheriff, Mr. Mottley
and your honor, I have not been in my home since June 10th,
due to the simple fact that I had no lights. I was with m
mother. On june 21st, we went to Lancaster, South Carolina,
for a funeral.
At this point the judge intervenes and begins to move the parties toward a
settlement. Before ultimately succeeding, he encounters resistance from each
of them. Newell continues to avoid his direct questions about the debt,
insisting instead on repeating her denials of Mottley's allegations about her
behavior. For his part, Mottley continues to press for repossession, but never
elicits a direct response from the judge.
TEXT 2F
JUDGE: Sir, how much money, uh, does Ms. Newell owe you at this
particular time?
MO-I-IELY: Um, at this particular time, she owe two month rent. She ...
JUDGE: And the payments are how much a month?
MO-I'LEY: $44 a month.
JUDGE: $44 a month?
MO-1FLEY: Yes.
JUDGE: And she's two payments behind at this time?
MOTTLEY: Yeah, yeah.
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JUDGE:
NEWELL:
JUDGE:
NEWELL:
MOTTLEY:
NEWELL:
MOTTLEY:
JUDGE:
MO-ITLEY AND
NEWELL:
JUDGE:
NEWELL:
JUDGE:
NEWELL:
JUDGE:
NEWELL:
JUDGE:
MOTTLEY:
JUDGE:
MOTTLEY:
JUDGE:
MOTTLEY:
JUDGE:
MOI-FLEY:
JUDGE:
NEWELL:
JUDGE:
NEWELL:
JUDGE:
NEWELL:
JUDGE:
Ms. Newell, do you have any intention of paying this money, uh,
to this gentleman here in relationship to him having paid it
already?
As I said, your honor, I have been out of town. My great-
grandmother has passed away.
Well now, I can understand that, but I'm asking you ....
When I returned to my home on the first, the office manager
and the neighbor told me that Mr. Newell was at my door.
[hey had to fix my door in which I have to pay for, because he
kicked it.
No, I didn't.
Yes, he did.
[Laughing].
Now let me ask you a question, um, Ms. Newell -
[Both laughmg-].
Did you intend to pay this amount of money that's owed on this
furniture at this time?
I had ever' intentions to pay. When I returned, I called my job.
[hey told me that the sheriff had been there. I called
downtown in which I talked with the sheriff of car 619. He told
me that he had a paper for me and I told him exactly where I
was. I gave him the phone number. I had no reason to hide.
Ms. Newell, when do you plan to pay this money that, uh, was
owed to this gentleman here?
He can have it tomorrow if he wants, but, if he wants his
furniture, he's ...
I'm asking a question: When do you plan to pay him the money
that's owed at this time?
I had planned to pay him when I returned from out of town.
Then Mr., uh, sir, would you be willing to accept the payments
that are due at this particular point from Ms. Newell?
Um, sir, to, to, to ease her problem, I would, I would, I
wouldn't regret past payment. I would just like to possess the
furniture. Then, I don't have to be bothered with nobody at
this point of time. She owe me two months' money, it's O.K., I
will, I need it.
[he question that I'm asking you, inasmuch as, um, Ms. Newell
does owe you this money ...
Uh-huh.
... are you willing to accept this money that she owes you, uh,
to Rhodes on this bill?
Yeah.
You are willing to do that?
Yeah.
Ms. Newell, when do you plan to pay this money to, uh, this
gentleman here?
[hat's what I'm trying to explain. As I said, I was willing to pay
him when I left. And when I returned, and then when I came
back to a job, which I was fired from, because of the sheriff.
Well, when do you plan to, when do you plan to pay the
gentleman?
I can pay him next week.
What day next week can you pay him?
What's the date, the 13th? Round the 24th.
After listening to the testimony from the plaintiff and the
defendant, in relationship, sir, to what was said by Ms. Newell
here that she was gonna pay you this amount of money that's
owed in order to bring this account up to date on the 24th of
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this month, I'm gonna continue this case until the 27th, June
27th, '86 at I I a.m. Now, if this, uh, money has been paid to
you in that period of time ...
MOITLEY: Uh-hum.
JUDGE: ...of course, you can call me at my office and I'll be able to
handle the situation at that point. Now, if this is not done on
the 24th, I'm gonna hear the case on the 27th ofJne '86 at I I
a.m., and I'm gonna enter a judgment at that time.
By almost any objective measure, this outcome would be deemed a
success-for the plaintiff, the system, and even the defendant. The plaintiff
has the defendant's agreement to pay the arrearage, backed up by the threat
of a judgment. The judge has ignored Mottley's claim for repossession, but
there is no clear evidence that he is entitled to that remedy.3 I Mottley appears
to have secured a legal victory, along with some practical help in collecting his
prospective judgment. The result also seems ideal from the perspective of the
judicial system. Rather than simply pronouncing judgment, the judge has
used his authority as leverage in moving the parties toward a consensual
resolution, with an attendant increase in the likelihood of compliance.12
Presumably, a plaintiff who both wins and gets paid will be a satisfied
customer of the system. The outcome is positive even for Newell, given the
fact that she never denies the agreement with Mottley or her failure to pay.
She keeps the furniture, she has two more weeks to pay, and, if she does so,
she avoids the entry of a judgment against her. Moreover, she has had an
opportunity to defend her conduct and denounce Mottley's, an opportunity
that seems to have been important to her.
There is evidence, however, that the judge's decision entirely misses the
point of the dispute, and is thus likely to be a source of more trouble rather
than a source of satisfaction. Recall, for example, that Mottley began the case
by denying a legally irrelevant accusation about his relationship with Newell
that she must have made at another time and place. For her part, Newell
ignored the legal thrust of his case, even when the judge demanded that she
address it, and insisted on justifying her conduct during the relationship.
Note also Mottley's repeated demands for repossession, and in particular his
comment that "I would just like to possess the furniture. Then, I don't have
to be bothered with nobody ....
In separate interviews immediately after the trial, Mottley and Newell
elaborated on these hints and shed further light on their hidden agendas and
their satisfaction with the outcome. In Text 2G, Mottley responds to a
question about whether he was satisfied with the trial. He focuses more
directly on his interest in repossession as a way to end his dealings with
Newell, and asks the interviewer, almost plaintively, if she appreciates the
point that the judge apparently missed.
31. The documentation for the Rhodes Furniture transaction was not put into evidence.
Mottley's testimony suggests only an oral agreement that he would guarantee Newell's debt in
exchange for her promise to make the payments.
32. See McEwen & Maiman, Mediation i Small Claims Court: ..lchievig Compliance Tnonglh Colsetlt.
18 LAw & Soc'y REV. II (1984).
Page 18 1: Autumn 1988]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
MO-ITLEY:
INTERVIEWER:
MOTTLEY:
INTERVIEWER:
MOTTLEY:
TEXT 2G
Well, with the judge running this, he spoke about, it would be
too much for me. You know, my main point is, if I could
possess my furniture.
Is that what you really wanted to do?
Yeah, I would be, I would, I don't have to be bothered with her,
I would be O.K. You see?
Uh-huh.
You see, that's all I want. [Alottlev departs huniedly.]
Finally, in an interview a few minutes later, Newell solves the mystery of
the hidden agenda. Text 2H begins in the middle of Newell's retelling the
story of Mottley coming to her home to collect the payments.
TEXT 2H
NEWELI:
INTERVIEWER:
NEWELL:
INTERVIEWER:
NEWEL L:
INTERVIEWER:
NEWELL:
INTERVIEWER:
NEWELL:
INTERVIEWER:
NEWELL:
INTERVIEWER:
NEWELL:
There was a lot, the day he said he came by and I wouldn't let
him in, the man wanted me to open the door naked. I was
getting out of the shower, and he expected me to jump up and
run down to the door. But he got in. And he was nasty. And
the reason I refused to argue with him [in court], 'cause he was
lying. And I knew that judge knew he was lying. And the fact
about he didn't know what was on that stuff [the Rhodes
documents], he [Mottlev knew. And I started to tell the judge
the exact truth as to why he decided to come to court ...
Why is that?
... but I felt that it was like personal.
Right.
I turned him down.
Oh yeah?
And that stuff was bought as a gift, all right.
When you first, like, bought the stuff, did you think you'd have
to pay him at all?
Uh-uh [negative]. But then I told him that mv intentions was
wrong as far as except, um, letting him give, and I would prefer
to pay him, because he was expecting a little more, and I wasn't
going to give him no more [laughterl.
[A'ewell comments further on Mllottle '"s aggressive behavior, and explains
that he friend introduced .1ottlev to her "'to get hin off her back. " ]
Did you want the furniture to begin with, or is it just something
that he got you? I mean, now that you've got it, do you want to
go ahead and pay' for it, or
The truth?
Yeah.
I was hoping he'd tell that man he could have his stuff. I really
was. Because he's a pest. He is a home pest.
Newell's revelation finally explains the enigma of the parties' trial tactics.: 3
Mottley's repeated demands for repossession now seem less a property claim
than a request for what amounts to a divorce, a divorce to which Newell would
consent. Those aspects of their testimony that seemed so out of place in a
contract case-for example, his response to a pre-existing accusation about
the start of their relationship, and her insistence on constantly justifying her
33. It may be significant that the interviewer is a female law sludent of about the same age as
Newell.
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conduct-are perfectly appropriate in the context of a domestic relations case.
Indeed, such issues are the essence of a domestic case.
From this perspective, the result reached by the judge looks far less
successful. Its substantive terms are unresponsive to the real desires of the
parties. From a procedural standpoint, the judge's mediating approach seems
to be exactly what.the parties do not want or need. They are tired of dealing
with each other and have looked to the court for a termination of their
relationship that they seem unable to bring about by themselves. Instead, the
court extends the relationship for at least two more weeks.
We do not mean to suggest that in this case the judge could or should have
addressed the subjective needs of the parties. In limiting himself to the two
payments currently in arrears, the judge avoided a number of difficult,
perhaps irreconcilable, legal and factual issues pertaining to the effect of the
missing contract documents and the terms of the oral contract between
Mottley and Newell. Moreover, his tactic of maneuvering the parties into an
agreement is in accord with the prevailing view that mediation promotes
compliance.' 4 Since his court has authority only' to issue money judgments,
one can hardly criticize him for not engaging in what Vidmar calls "deep"
mediation, which involves "exploration of non-legal issues that might
underlie the dispute." -3 5
Our point, rather, concerns the difficulty of classifying an outcome as
"successful" for a particular litigant or for the system. In this case, the docket
showed only a claim for an unpaid debt, an agreement by the defendant to
pay, and a dismissal before any judgment was entered. Attendance at the trial
and study of the trial transcript seemed only to confirm the appearance of
success all around: The plaintiff got much of what he asked for, the defendant
avoided the onus of a judgment, and the judge brought it all about by leading
the parties toward a settlement. The hidden agenda of the parties, and the
value of the outcome in relation to it, become clear only when a persistent-
and, fortuitously, young,. female-posttrial interviewer strikes a responsive
chord and elicits "the exact truth" from Newell.
V
CONCLUSION
Cases such as these present a strong argument for the value of detailed
qualitative research in the evaluation of procedural reform. In order to
determine whether a given reform meets a particular need, it is first necessary
to define that need with precision. The goal of informal justice, as practiced
in small claims courts, has often been defined in terms of meeting the needs of
ordinary people with real economic grievances who cannot afford real
litigation." Research assessing the success of informal justice has, in turn,
34. See McEwen & Maiman, supra note 32.
35. See Vidniar, supra note 10, at 523.
36. SeeJ. RUHNKA & S. WELLER, SMALL CLAIMS COURTS: A NATIONAl. EXAMINATION 1-5 (1978).
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tended to assume that litigants are primarily motivated by rational economic
concerns.3 7 Efforts at greater precision in measuring success have focused
primarily on refining the analysis of the system's ability to meet litigants'
presumed economic concerns. As for non-economic motives, analysts have
tended either to ignore them or to note them but then put them aside as too
difficult to quantify or control. : 8
In examining litigants' statements in presenting their cases as well as their
statements before and after the presentation, we are constantly reminded of
the importance-if not the preeminence-of non-economic factors. In large
numbers of cases, there is compelling linguistic evidence that a hidden agenda
is the primary agenda. Repeatedly, parties press ahead in objectively hopeless
cases, apparently driven by a need to prove something to themselves, to have
a person in authority affirm the importance of their problems, or to achieve
some social objective only indirectly related to the litigation.3 ' , Conversely,
many litigants such as Freeman and Mottley "win" their cases but still come
away dissatisfied with the process because it has failed in some significant way
to meet these other needs..
The point of this argument is not that the legal system should adopt the
goal of identifying and satisfying litigants' personal and social needs. Rather,
in evaluating the existing litigation process and designing alternatives to it,
the law should not leave unexamined the assumptions about rational
economic goals that permeate the civil justice system. For example, if one
were designing a pretrial mediation program, the objective presumably would
be to settle cases by moving litigants to a position of mutual satisfaction. The
assumption that litigants are primarily motivated by a desire to maximize their
economic return might lead to a design wherein lawyers exchange demands
and offers, with comments by the mediator on likelihood of success at trial.
However, these data suggest that mutual satisfaction is frequently more than a
matter of financial accord. Thus, a design that took into account the concerns
that litigants express might put considerable emphasis on such a simple
expedient as giving the litigants an unfettered opportunity to state their case
to someone in a position of authority. 4
This discussion raises the obvious question of the applicability of our
findings to formal justice. The phenomena described in this article are
widespread among informal court litigants. Are these concerns also
significant to litigants in larger cases in "real" courts, particularly litigants
37. There are a number of studies of informal justice that examine litigant behavior in detail.
Even in these studies, however, it is usually assumed that the issue is a "dispute" that is within the
competence of the forum. See, e.g., Mather & Yngvesson, Language, Audieice and the 7)asformahion of
Disputes, 15 LAw & Soc'y RE'. 775 (1980-81). Cf McEwen & Niaiman, supra note 32 (investigating
structural and psychological factors that promote differential compliance with judgments in
mediation and adjudication).
38. See, e.g., Vidmar, supra note 10, at 521.
39. As one litigant testified, "The reason I'm fighting so hard is that if I don't get something
back at home mv wife was gonna, you know, really take care of me."
40. Cf Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Transformation of Disputes: .Vamig, Blaming, Clainmig. 15
lAw & So(c'y RExV. 631, 648-49 (1980-81) (comparing law and psychotherapy).
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acting on behalf of corporations? At this point in our research we do not
know. Anecdotal evidence from lawyers and clients 4" and personal
experience -4 2 suggests, however, that non-economic hidden agendas may be
far more important in commercial litigation than has generally been assumed.
We view this as an interesting and important question for further research. 4:3
In conclusion, we argue that all facets of a litigant's motivation need to be
discovered and factored into the process of procedural reform. We suggest
that detailed, qualitative analysis of unrehearsed litigant speech is an effective
means of uncovering the full range of litigant concerns, and that such analysis
should be an essential component of the empirical study of legal procedure.
Both empiricists and theoreticians must avoid becoming so absorbed in the
demands of their own traditions of thought that they forget the value of
listening to what people are telling them.
41. We have raised this question frequently with lawyers and formal court litigants in the course
of 15 years of empirical study of the legal system.
42. One of us (Conley) has been a teacher and practitioner of civil litigation lor 12 ycars.
43. Our findings may also have implications for legal education. As the presence of'
interviewing, negotiation, and client counseling courses attests, the curriculum in most law schools is
giving increasing attention to the need to understand and communicate effectively with clients. We
believe that the study of litigant speech can make an important contribution to the development ofa
coherent theoretical base for this effort.
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